The Contradictions of the Khaleeji Imperialist Sub-Bloc (Part 1: The Conflict between Qatar and the ‘Saudi’ Arabia-‘United Arab Emirates’ group)
The Khaleeji sub-bloc has been simmering in it’s own contradictions for decades.
While this doesn’t mean that they cannot or have not worked together on different occasions, in fact they were working together in Syria (until ‘Saudi’ Arabia and the ‘Emirates’, against the wishes of Qatar, let the Bashar Al Assad government of Syria back into the Arab League in 2023), in Yemen between Al Islah (Qatari-backed, weirdly friendly with ‘Saudi’ Arabia, strange), the Hadi/Alimi government (‘Saudi’-backed) and the Southern Transitional Council (‘Emirati’-backed), (until the conflicts between the ‘Saudi’-backed Hadi government and the ‘Emirati’-backed Southern Transitional Council in 2019), and the ‘UAE’ and ‘Saudi’ Arabia have regularly collaborated against groups that are supported by Qatar and/or Iran, there are clear and obvious lines of conflict between the three major Khaleeji US client states, ‘Saudi’ Arabia 🇸🇦, the ‘United Arab Emirates’ 🇦🇪, and Qatar 🇶🇦.
While the internal contradictions between the different actors in the Khaleej sub-bloc, mainly two of our three main actors (Al Saud and the ‘Saudi’ Comprador Bourgeoise/‘Saudi’ Arabia and the seven criminal families of the ‘Emirati’ Bourgeoise of the ‘United Arab Emirates’), had existed before, they were never extremely serious. In the case of the ‘Emirates’, it was conflicts over a small amount of territory and a some oil.
Serious cracks, however, would first emerge when Qatar begin the process of splitting from the ‘Saudi’ Gulf Sub-Bloc.
The Contradiction between the rest of the Khaleej and Qatar
However, the contradiction between Qatar and the ‘Saudi’-‘Emirati’ group would only emerge in 1995, with the Qatari coup d'état, which saw Qatar’s former government under the leadership of Emir Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, which was fine with being a client to ‘Saudi’ Arabia, with Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, who would attempt to seize the role of main Khaleeji power, trying to make the rest of the Arab world subject to Qatari (but still US alligned) interests and even try to take the role of strongest US-aligned Arab state, with the help of their friends, the Muslim Brotherhood, a reactionary Hanbali Sunni Muslim group.
The Muslim Brotherhood, while not Wahabbi (but still Salafi), was previously aligned with ‘Saudi’ Arabia until the Brotherhood tried to seize more power through helping organize and supporting the Sahwah (Awakening) Movement (also supported by pre-Al Qaeda Bin Laden, which desired to make ‘Saudi’ Arabia more under Wahhabi principles and more anti-American, calling for the expulsion of US troops from the Arabian Peninsula, like the ones fighting Saddam during the First Iraq War and the US Military Base in Eskan, which was crushed.
This is shown by the continuation of the residence of Yusuf al Qaradawi, an Egyptian-born Qatari ʿĀlim connected with the Muslim Brotherhood, in Qatar even after the break between ‘Saudi’ Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Now, ‘Saudi’ Arabia and the ‘United Arab Emirates’ was not happy with this, and Qatar’s increasing independence from the rest of the Gulf, and Qatar’s dreams of projecting it’s power and influence throughout that Arab world, and so would help launch a retaliatory coup d'état attempt with the help of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt and the Saudi puppet regime in Bahrain, and their domestic agents and allies in Qatar, Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad al Thani and ex-Emir Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, though this would fail.
Now there is a contradiction between the ‘Saudi’ Arabia (and it’s then ally the ‘UAE’, and it’s puppet Bahrain) and Qatar.
‘Saudi’ Arabia and the Saudi Comprador Bourgeoise had only recently seized the role of strongest US puppet regime from Egypt and was not willingly to allow Qatar to compete with them for this role. On the other hand, they could not invade Qatar, even though they probably could have cooked up a justification for that action, as Qatar had not broken from the US bloc, which had recently won the Cold War against the revisionist USSR and had made itself the only superpower, and so Qatar was still important to the US as a base against Saddam’s Iraq and Iran, and as a source of oil, and so an invasion of Qatar would probably not be supported by the US, and Qatar was not the Saudi bourgeoise’s main enemy at this time, in fact they had a common enemy in the form of Iran, which was looking to export the Islamic Revolution to the entire Muslim world, including ‘Saudi’ Arabia and Qatar.
‘Saudi’ Arabia and Qatar would remain in a shaky alliance throughout the 2000s, however contradictions between the the Saudi and Qatari Comprador Bourgeoise would intensify, and Qatar, while staying in the US bloc and continuing to happily host the largest air base in the Khaleej, the Al Udeid Air Base, would refuse to break off connections with anti-US states and groups, openly continuing to operate (though refusing to develop it further between 2010-2017) the joint Iranian-Qatari South Pars/North Dome Gas Condensate Field, the world’s largest natural gas field, and keeping good relations with Iran.
It also secretly (possibly) funds the Al Nusra Front, Ansar Din, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Sunni Insurgents in Iraq, the National Liberation Movement of Azawad, Hamas (^w^), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and even Daesh and Al Qaeda (a Qatari official was accused of being an Al Qaeda funder). However, apart from Hamas, because of course ‘Saudi’ wouldn’t support the only historically progressive force in this list, Saudi also has alleged links to most of these organizations.
The intensifying contradictions between ‘Saudi’ Arabia and Qatar would be shown by the withdraw of the ‘Saudi’ ambassador to Qatar from Doha between 2002–2008 to try to warn the Qatari bourgeoise to stop trying to build there own sub-bloc separate from the ‘Saudi’ nest. This obviously did not work.
The major break with ‘Saudi’ would be the Arab Spring. Qatar, through it’s news network Al Jazeera, through it’s funding of the Muslim Brotherhood and other such groups, and through other methods, would promote the protests that rocked through the Arab Spring which were aimed at overthrowing the various tyrants (Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, Gaddafi (Gaddafi, while a positive figure from 1969–2003, would become reactionary after his détente with the West), who were all overthrown, Assad (who, contrary to what your favourite Russia loving ‘anti-imperialist’ would want you to believe, IS a tyrant, though the opposition isn’t much better than him), which would lead to a civil war, Hamad al Khalifa, which would lead to a Saudi intervention against his almost overthrow by Shia protestors, and others).
This was much to the chagrin of the ‘Saudi’ comprador bourgeoise and the ‘Emirati’ bourgeoise which would oppose almost most of the Arab Spring protests, especially the ones inside them, in Bahrain (though with the level of control ‘Saudi’ has over Bahrain, it is essentially a province of ‘Saudi’ pretending to be a country), and in Egypt.
The Contradiction between Qatar and the rest of the Khaleej would come to a boiling point in the 2010s.
Egypt: The First Battle, ends in a Qatari defeat
An Egyptian revolution. Hosni Mubarak has been overthrown. Who will take power now?
A major victory for Qatar would occur with the election of Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/Freedom and Justice Party, with the Egyptian comprador bourgeoise backing Morsi and aligning with Qatar, believing that the Morsi regime could silence the anger of the masses, and that the new Egypt could gain a more favourable position in the Arab world as the clients of the rising Qatari-Turkish sub-bloc.
Yusuf al Qaradawi would go home to Egypt, and more radical Salafists were able to openly organize groups to spread Salafi beliefs, with groups being either unbanned, like the Islamic Party/Peace and Development Party (the party allied with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group with killed Anwar Sadat), Al Nour Party, Al Jama’a al Islamiyya, the Islamic Labour Party, or being able to be organized new parties freely, like the Flag Party of the Salafist preacher Hazem Salah Abu Ismail.
However, Morsi could not end the crisis in Egypt. Egypt continued to have soaring food prices, mass youth unemployment, unemployment in general, high inflation, and generally continued to be in an economic crisis, leading to rising of the anger of the Egyptian masses.
There was also fear from the Copts that the new regime would begin persecuting them, and from women that the Muslim Brotherhood regime would take away the rights of women. While the Muslim Brotherhood would claim that they would not persecute Copts and wouldn’t attack the rights of women, this was not believed by the majority of Copts and a large section of the women of Egypt.
Increasingly, after the initial rush of euphoria with the establishment of a Liberal Democratic regime in Egypt, there was increasing unrest against the new government, against the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood and their inability to save the economy of Egypt, both amongst the proletariat and among factions of the comprador bourgeoise in Egypt.
‘Saudi’ and the ‘UAE’ would also despise this new regime, because:
- A Muslim Brotherhood regime is a Qatari-Turkish aligned regime. Egypt is the largest Arab country, with control of the very important Suez Canal which allows Qatar the ability to easily cut off ‘Saudi’ and ‘Emirati’ oil exports if necessary.
- The overthrow of a comprador regime in Egypt (even if a new comprador regime was established afterwards) would inspire the masses to protests in other Arab countries and lead to the overthrow of other pro-‘Saudi’/‘Emirati’ regimes in the Arab world.
They would make an alliance with ‘Israel’ in this field, as ‘Israel’ did not wish to see a pro-Hamas Muslim Brotherhood government come to power. The ‘Saudis’, ‘Emiratis’ and ‘Israelis’ made common cause against Qatar, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in order to overthrow the Morsi government.
This would lead to mass protests in June 2013, as both large sections of the proletariat and peasantry of Egypt, as well as factions of the bourgeoise aligned with ‘Saudi’ and the ‘Emirates’, would protest against the Morsi government.
El-Sisi, the head of the Egyptian Army and an agent of the ‘Saudi’ Arabia and the ‘UAE’, would overthrow the Morsi government, supress the entire opposition, both the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned, other Salafist, Liberal Democratic and Leftist opposition, an Egyptian Brumaire.
Qatar lost in Egypt.
Libya: A ‘Saudi’-‘Emirati’/Qatari Proxy War
In Libya, after the fall Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, different factions of the Libyan compraodor bourgeoise class would engage in war in order to come out on top, and these factions would be backed by different regional groupings.
Libya is significant because it is the first armed conflict which Qatar (and it’s ally Turkey) have been on where it is in a direct conflict against ‘Saudi’ Arabia and the ‘UAE’, with Qatar and Turkey supporting the Government of National Accord, and with ‘Saudi’ and the ‘UAE’ backing General Khalifa Haftar and the House of Representatives.
Why?
The Qatari bourgeoise would gain from the GNA’s victory because it would gain a strategically located (in the centre of North Africa with access to the Mediterranean sea) resource rich (full of oil and natural gas, and in terms of humans, a potentially even easier source of human labour. It would get rid of an ally for ‘Saudi’ and the ‘Emirates’. Vice versa for the interests of the ‘Saudi’-‘Emirati’ group and their puppets, the Libyan House of Representatives and the Khalifa Haftar-controlled Libyan National Army.
Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi Colonel who would be kicked out of the country after trying to overthrow Gaddafi, is the head of the Libyan National Army, and an agent of the ‘UAE’. He is also supported by the Sudanese Rapid Security Forces, the descendants of the genocidal Janjaweed militia that committed the Darfur Genocide, and is currently doing murder and genocide in Third Sudanese Civil War, and stealing Sudanese gold and giving it to the ‘United Arab Emirates’. He was the most powerful figure in the Libyan House of Representatives.
The war would go on for just over half a decade, until continued fighting ended in 2020, when they agreed to solve things later. The House of Representatives and the Government of National Accord would dissolve and form the Government of National Unity. Libya is still divided, however, between the Libyan National Army and the Libyan forces and militias aligned with the Qatari-backed forces, who occasionally still fight from time to time.
This peace lies on a knife’s edge.
It’s a ceasefire for now, and nobody has won or lost (well, ‘Saudi’ lost, with Khalifa Haftar’s LNA siding with the ‘Emirates’ in the ‘Saudi’-‘Emirates’ split, but we’ll talk about that more later).
